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ABSTRACT
The political climate is ripe for the United Nations system to successfully and effectively
provide global collective security. Now that relations have improved between the ‘East’ and
‘West’ the United Nations will indeed be able to broaden its role, and perhaps operate to its
full capacity - to call into being the ‘New World Order,’ characterised by a Security Council
able to respond swiftly and effectively to aggression and massive human rights violations
through ‘police action’. However the significant and documented international humanitarian
law violations by UN forces in the 1990s has raised the stakes. Thrice in the last decade of the
20th Century, national adjudicative mechanisms failed to uphold justice for the victims of
international humanitarian law violations by UN forces. The stakes are high; the credibility
of UN sanctioned military operations, the accountability of UN troops to international
humanitarian law standards and the adherence to the international rule-of-law regime
envisioned in the drive to the permanent International Criminal Court. The UN's distinction
in its status as a superior legal and moral entity means that it should be held to an even
higher standard than the traditional subjects of the laws of war.

I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement are concepts that have their origins in the United
Nations Charter.1 Among other things, the UN Charter is based on principles of sovereignty,
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1
The Charter of the United Nations was established as a consequence of the United Nations Conference on the
International Organisation held at San Francisco and was brought into force on 24 October 1945. As of 1995,
membership in the UN had reached a total of 185 states. For a reproduction of the Charter, see I. Brownlie, Basic
Documents in International Law (4th, 1995) 1-35.
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non-intervention and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.2 Although
peacekeeping was not explicitly provided for in the Charter, it has evolved over the past half
century into a well-developed concept governed by a distinct set of principles. During the
Cold War the United Nations was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises
because of vetoes - 279 of them - cast in the Security Council.3 However, since the end of the
Cold War there have been fewer vetoes, and the security arm of the United Nations, once
disabled by circumstances beyond its control, has emerged as a central instrument for the
prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Between 1947 and
1985, a span of 38 years, the United Nations undertook thirteen ‘peacekeeping’ missions of
varying scope, duration, and degree of success.4 Between 1985 and 1992, a span of only seven
years, the United Nations undertook an equal number of missions with increasingly ambitious
mandates.5 The UN has chosen the avenue of active military involvement in situations
characterised by an escalating level of hostility that endangers the lives of its troops.
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Ibid., Articles 2(1), 2(7) and 33 respectively.
An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, GA 47th Sess, Agenda Item 10, para 14, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992), reprinted in ILM 953,
958(1992) (Agenda for Peace).
4
The thirteen missions between 1947 and 1985 include in chronological order: UN Special Committee on the
Balkans (‘UNSCOB’) 1947-1951;UN Truce Supervision Organisation (‘UNTSO’) 1948-;UN Military Observer
group in India and Pakistan (‘UNMOGIP’) 1949-;UN Emergency Force (‘UNEF I’) 1956-67;UN Observation
Group in Lebanon (‘UNOGIL’) 1958;UN Operation in Congo (‘ONUC’) 1960-64; UN Temporary Executive
Authority (‘UNTEA’) 1962-63; UN Yemen Observation Mission (‘UNYOM’) 1962-63; UN Force in Cyprus
(‘UNFICYP’) 1964-; UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (‘UNIPOM’) 1964-66; UN Emergency Force II
(‘UNEF II) 1974-79; UN Disengagement Observer Force (‘UNDOF’) 1974-; UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(‘UNIFIL’) 1978-. See W.M. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (1993) 8.
5
In chronological order this missions include; UN Good Offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan (‘UNGOMAP’)
1988-89; UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (‘UNIMOG’) 1988-91; UN Angola Verification Mission
(‘UNAVEM I’); 1988-91; UN Transition Assistance Group (‘UNTAG’) 1989-90; UN Observer Group in
Central America (‘ONUCA’) 1989-91; UN Angola Verification Mission II (‘UNSVEM’) 1991-; UN IraqKuwait Observation Mission (‘UNIKOM’) 1991-; UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
(‘MINURSO’) 1991-; UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (‘UNAMIC’) 1991-92; UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (‘UNTAC’) 1992-;l UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (‘UNPROFOR’) 1992-; UN Operation in
Somalia 1992-.Id. at 10.
3
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Following the end of the Cold War, the UN has developed a new aggressive role in its
peacekeeping efforts. Military-style enforcement actions such as the humanitarian
interventions in Somalia, Iraq and recently in East Timor and situations like Bosnia, where a
traditional peacekeeping mission6 involves an escalating use of force, must be anticipated as
peacekeeping7 and peacemaking8 operations blend together in humanitarian interventions.
The arena of peacekeeping has evolved from the use of force only in self-defence and a
goodwill presence authorised by host government to active military action by UN authorised
international forces against aggressive governments. With the practice of the Security Council
during interventions in Iraq and Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and more recently in East
Timor, humanitarian interventions have taken on a new role in collective international use of
force through 'police' action. The Security Council's authorisation to use force, in part to
combat the 'widespread and flagrant' violations of international humanitarian law, has resulted
in the gradual embossment of peace enforcement over peacekeeping missions as evidenced by
6

Traditional peacekeeping normally occurs in the aftermath of cross-border disagreements or conflicts where the
belligerents have either fought themselves to exhaustion or have lost their appetite for conflict. At that point, the
UN sends in military personnel to separate hostile forces and/or monitor borders, ceasefires, or force movements.
These lightly armed peacekeepers operate with the consent of all involved and with strict concern for
impartiality and minimising interference in any States domestic affairs. This was the original non-offensive
peacekeeping operation fashioned by Dag Hammarskjold, preventive rather than corrective solutions to keep
great powers out of peripheral crises and thus forestall their escalation.
7
Symbolising the new post-Cold War spirit, in January 1992 the UN Security Council met for the first time ever
at the level of heads of State or government. The summit asked the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to
prepare a keynote strategy document for UN peace operations in the new era. Entitled An Agenda for Peace,
above note 1 it set out to define more diverse and robust roles for the UN. Two proposed departures from
previous practice were critical. First, it defined peacekeeping as ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in
the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned’ (para 20). Here was a clear signal that the UN
might, in some instances, seek to deploy peacekeepers without local consent. Second, the document noted that
ceasefires had often been agreed to in the past but not complied with, making it necessary for the UN to try and
restore a ceasefire. The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council consider the utilisation of
peace-enforcement units (para 44). Here the Secretary General was calling for a new United Nations military
role (a quasi-enforcement role) altogether, beyond traditional peacekeeping (non-offensive military presence).
8
‘Peacemaking’ is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those
foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter. Agenda for Peace, above note 1, at para. 20. Peacemaking differs from
traditional peacekeeping in breadth and depth or both. It differs in at least two ways. One is that the UN now
engages in preventive deployment in that it places a robust force along a border or ‘hotspot’ before a crisis even

4

the subsequent expansion of the mandates of UNOSOM and UNPROFOR.9

While the norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence continue to
play a pivotal role in international relations today, they have been weakened by the numerous
international treaty obligations that States have taken on, as well as the growing idea that
through collective UN authorisation, governments have the right to 'intervene' when a human
rights violation might threaten international peace. In addition, there has developed a norm
that member States of the UN have the responsibility to ensure that human rights violations in
other States are addressed. The growing body of human rights law and the developing practice
of the UN Security Council's Article 39 determinations in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and recently
in East Timor that led to forcible interventions all point to an emerging customary norm of
UN humanitarian intervention in member States where the humanitarian violations are severe
and have the slightest transboundary effect. 10 As the Security Council liberalises the finding
of 'threat to the peace' to include non-military threats, the likelihood of future humanitarian
interventions will also increase. 11
occurs. A second way is when the UN involves itself in intraState affairs by helping new or collapsed States set
up governmental structures and maintain law and order.
9
UNOSOM-United Nations Operation in Somalia, established by SC Resolution 751, 24 April 1992;
UNPROFOR-United Nations Protection Force, established by UN SC Resolution 776, February 1992.
10
Iraq-SC Resolution 688, 5 April 1991; Somalia- SC Resolution 794, 3 December 1992; Bosnia-SC Resolution
836, 4 June 1992; East Timor-SC Resolution 1264, 15 September 1999.
11
During the post-Cold War era, a number of UN sanctioned military operations have been carried out in the
name of humanitarianism. This involves coercive military interference in the sphere of jurisdiction of a
sovereign State motivated or legitimated by a commitment to promote international order and human rights. The
Security Council has linked humanitarian crises to the right to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter inorder
to restore international peace and security. As the Secretary-general notes in Report of the Secretary-General on
the Work of the Organisation, GA, 54th Sess., Sup. No.1 (A/54/1) there is need to protect civilians in armed
conflict, facilitate access to humanitarian assistance and address the flouting of humanitarian norms (para 191). It
should be noted that Oppeinheim laid out authoritatively intervention in light of the territorial supremacy of
States by virtue of State sovereignty. He defined intervention as ‘dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs
of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things. He noted that such
intervention can take place by right or without right. While intervention is as a rule forbidden by the Family of
Nations, Oppeinheim analysed instances in which intervention without right (forcible intervention) can be
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The ‘New World Order,’ which envisions collective police actions by the members of the
international community, presents an alternative to the traditional wars of self-defence. The
Security Council can authorise enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
ranging from economic sanctions (under Article 41), to collective military action (under
Article 42). Article 39 states that ‘the Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.’12 Although collective action would usually take the
form of global action, authorised under Article 42, it could also be implemented by regional
organisations, authorised under Article 53.13 Thus, under the new world order, the UN will
‘police’ wars by getting involved at the outset of conflicts and enforcing peace through the
measures authorised under Chapter VII.

14

This erosion of the principle of non-intervention

set forth by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has contributed, in part, to the increase in UN
interventions in the post-Cold War world, which in turn has occasionally led to complex

admissible or excusable. Among the basic criteria that Oppeinheim sets out for admissible intervention is, to
enforce international treaty obligations in a delinquent State and, in the case of violation by a State of universally
recognised principles of the Law of Nations whether violations occurred in time of war or peace. He emphasised
that the Law of Nations recognises the rule that ‘interventions in the interests of humanity are admissible
provided they are exercised in the form of a collective intervention of the Powers’ noting that intervention is a de
facto matter of policy, not constrained by any hard and fast rules. In present time in view of Oppenheim’s
analysis, UN sanctioned multinational humanitarian interventions premised on promotion of international peace
and security, and protection of human rights in States violating international norms are thus justifiable as these
are interests common to all members of the international community, and laid down in international conventional
and customary law. See L. Oppeinheim, International Law: A Treatise (Peace) (1905) 81-91.
12
UN Charter, above note 1.
13
T.M. Franck and F. Patel, ‘Agora: The Gulf Crisis In International and Foreign Relations Law: UN Police
Action in Lieu of War: ‘the Old Order Changeth’ (1991) 85 Am.J. Int’l L 63.
14
Cf. S. Hoffman, ‘Delusions of World Order’ N.Y. Rev of Books, Apr.9, 1992 at 37 (noting the difficulty of
establishing ‘world order’ given the distinction between international and domestic legitimacy, and advocating a
limited strategy for peacekeeping centred in the United Nations).
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operations that include elements of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.15

With the end of the Cold War, the ideological barrier between the ‘East’ and ‘West’, which
for decades gave rise to distrust and hostility, and had prevented the United Nations from
doing the job for which it was created -global collective security 16crumbled. In the post-Cold
War era the ability of the Security Council to achieve ‘Great Power Unanimity’17 on
operations authorised under Chapter VII of the Charter (to maintain or restore international
peace and security once peace has been threatened or breached) has enabled the UN to carve
out a much broader security role by acting as a watchdog over international disputes, a
peacemaker and peacekeeper after the event of conflict, and a facilitator of disarmament and
peaceful dispute resolution under Chapter VI of the Charter.18 As the number of both formal
UN peacekeeping operations as well as other UN authorised missions increases, it is
important to note that in the 1990s, UN missions had a chequered existence with instances of
violations of international humanitarian law by UN troops.19 The rules of engagement and
field operations by UN forces must be modified and articulately enunciated. The stakes are
high; the credibility of the UN missions,20 the accountability of UN troops to international
humanitarian law standards and the adherence to the international rule-of-law regime
15

Peace enforcement is where a specific act of aggression, or more general set of hostile actions, are collectively
identified as a threat to international peace and security, and the aggressor State is subjected to an array of
sanctions until its violation is reversed. Ultimately, enforcement can involve flat-out war-the ‘all necessary
means’ of SC Resolution 678, authorising what became Operation Desert Storm.
16
See generally, W. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping 2 (1993) 1.
17
UN Charter, Article 27(3).
18
See generally, A.V. Patil, The UN Veto in World Affairs 1946-1990: A Complete Record And Case Histories of
the Security Council’s Veto (1992) 14.
19
See the discussion in Part II of this article.
20
UNOSOM faced a dramatic loss of international and local credibility in Somalia in relation to standards (or
lack of them) applied in dealing with the public security function. See also, below note 31 which notes the
conduct of a number of UN troops in the Bulgarian contingent that displayed a lack of discipline as well as
ethics.
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envisioned in the drive to establish the permanent International Criminal Court.21

This article focuses on the issue of holding the UN accountable for violations of international
humanitarian law by UN forces. While the UN has acknowledged that international
humanitarian law applies to UN forces, a general policy that leaves enforcement to States to
which the UN troops belong does not guarantee justice for the victims of international
humanitarian violations in the face of competing national political and international justice
interests. 22 This is discussed later in the article. Holding the UN accountable for international
humanitarian law violations by troops serving under its command can only be achieved by the
UN directly possessing the rights and duties under international humanitarian law,23 thus
making this rights and duties binding on the UN as a concerned subject and to whom the law
really intends them to be addressed.24 Because rules of international law are formulated in
such an elliptical way, they transpose from the subject to the objects concerned, in this case
from the UN to the individual troops involved in UN military operations.

21

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 37 ILM 999 (not yet in
force)[hereinafter Rome Statute], adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. The final vote recorded was 120 in favour,
seven against and 20 abstentions. As at 1 January 2000, there were 89 signatures and four ratifications.
22
Section 4, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Observance by United Nations of International Humanitarian Law, 6
August 1999, ST/SGB/1999/13 (Secretary-General’s Bulletin). The Secretary-General’s Bulletin is to be viewed
as enshrinement of the observance of international humanitarian law in UN military operations as a matter of
authoritative reaffirmation of UN policy. The Bulletin entered into force on 12 August 199. The SecretaryGeneral’s Bulletin does not mark the first time in the acceptance of applicability of international humanitarian
law to UN military operations. The applicability of humanitarian laws was recognised as early as 1991 in the
Model Agreement Between The United Nations and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to
United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Annex to Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly,
A/64/185, 23 May 1991, Article X, ‘Applicability of international conventions’ para 28 (Model Agreement).
23
This will fulfil the lex specialis, so that whenever UN troops act, international humanitarian law will apply de
jure. In other words the law specifically expressed in the relevant instruments will regulate the given situation.
This is as opposed to a general UN policy that ‘[t]he fundamental principles and rules of international
humanitarian law…are applicable to United Nations forces…’ See Secretary-General’s Bulletin, above note 22.
24
This will ensure that the UN is bound by certain parts of international humanitarian law that lack opinio juris
and only apply to State Parties. See generally e.g. Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in
Complex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework (1999) 149-181.

8

II. THE PANDORA’S BOX: A CASE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW VIOLATIONS BY UN TROOPS IN SOMALIA

1. Introduction
This section of the article will look at the documented international humanitarian law
violations by UN troops in the UN sanctioned peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM25 as a case
study and will highlight the failure of national adjudicative mechanisms26 to guarantee justice
to the victims of violations.27 This singular focus on UNOSOM28 is in no way to suggest that
no other international humanitarian law violations have occurred in any other UN mission29
but rather because this particular humanitarian law violation allegations were also supported
by the testimonies of fellow troops, by photographic evidence30 in some instances and

25

See, UNOSOM, above note 10.
This is the method of enforcement of international humanitarian law among UN forces that has been endorsed
by the UN in section 4 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, above note 22. Yet the short history of enforcement
of international humanitarian law violations by States has already demonstrated a lack of political will and great
reluctance of States to prosecute their troops as discussed further in this section of the article.
27
The article will focus on Belgium and Italy. The Canadian contingent was also implicated in the violations
which resulted in the disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group battalion (CARBG) and the
prosecution of two soldiers who were part of the battalion for the death of a Somali youth in UN custody. See,
Amnesty International News, Vol. 27, No. 5, September 1997, at 1.
28
Ibid.
29
Most notable were the allegations relating to international humanitarian law violations by Dutch troops who
formed part of the UNPROFOR contingent. See generally, Reuters, ‘Dutch Soul-Searching Over Srebrenica’
August 17, 1998, online <http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98081710.html>; Andrew Kelly, ‘Tribunal
Hears How UN Troops Abandoned Srebenica Victims’ August 24, 1998,
online<http://linder.com/trbunal_html>. The history however stretches further back to UNTAC where damage
was done by the troops of the Bulgarian contingent who were amnestied convicts and whose discipline was
highly suspect. See, e.g., J.E. Heinnger, Peacekeeping in Transition-The UN in Cambodia (1994) 75-76.
30
In the case of the laws of war allegations against the Dutch contingent in UNPROFOR, a roll of film
(containing photos taken by Captain Ron Rutten) allegedly showing Dutch UN peacekeepers helping Bosnian
Serbs round up and single out Bosnian Moslems was destroyed in the process of development by military police
in what was termed as ‘accidental’. See, Agence France Presse,’ Former Dutch Minister Denies Destroying War
Crimes Evidence’ August 12, 1998,online <http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98081210.html>; Reuters,
‘Dutch Focus on Possible Srebenica Cover-up’ August 13, 1998, online
<http://www.centraleurope.com/ceo/news/98081310.html>.
26
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concerned States did establish investigative/judicial commissions31 to look into the allegations
and some of the troops did in fact get prosecuted for their acts and even in one case, an entire
battalion was disbanded as a result of the allegations of its actions that degraded and abused
the rights of Somalis.32

In March and April 1997, the press published the allegations of a former Belgian paratrooper
that human rights abuses had been committed against Somali citizens by members of the
Belgian armed forces who served in the multinational task force operating in Somalia in 1993.
The allegations were accompanied by photographs, one of which showed two uniformed
soldiers swinging a Somali boy over an open fire and was accompanied by the claim of the
former paratrooper that such behaviour was a regular practice in the paratroopers camp and
that the boy in this case had been threatened with being burnt alive. The ex-paratrooper also
made allegations partly supported by photographic evidence, that a Somali child had been
forcibly fed with salt water and possibly pork (a prohibited food for Muslims) until he
vomited and was made to eat his own vomit. Photographs also showed a soldier urinating on
the inanimate body of a Somali man lying on the ground, with a foot pressed on the man’s
body, and of soldiers holding a Somali man by his hair.33 There were also allegations that
around 23 October 1993 a child caught stealing food had been locked in a container, in

31

Italy established two investigative commissions, the first in May 1997 was a military commission headed by
General Vanucchi, the second in June was a judicial commission headed by Etore Gallo. In Belgium, an
administrative investigative tribunal was established by the Ministry of Defence headed by an army general. See,
below note 34 at 1; Amnesty International Report 1998: Belgium; Amnesty International, below note 31, at 10.
32
See, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), above note 27.
33
Amnesty International, ‘AI Concerns in Europe: January-June 1997’ AI Index EUR 01/06/97 (1997) 1.
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stifling heat, without food or drink, for two days and two nights, that its cries of distress were
ignored and that when the container was opened the child was found to be dead.34

In May 1997, Michele Patruno, an Italian who had served as a conscript in Somalia, claimed
that during 1993 Italian soldiers had kept prisoners for interrogation tied up in the sun and
deprived of water, or given only spicy food to increase their thirst. If they refused to talk, they
were subjected to blows, burning cigarettes applied to the soles of their feet, electric shocks to
the body, including to the testicles, or were thrown against razor wire fences. His allegations
were supported by photographs depicting soldiers apparently preparing to apply electrodes to
the body of a young Somali man lying half-naked on the ground.35

Between June and August 1997, a number of former Italian paratroopers also made public
allegations sometimes supported by photographic evidence, that in 1993 and 1994 while
serving as part of a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia, they had witnessed colleagues
torturing and ill-treating Somalis. In some cases the treatment was said to have resulted in
death. Somalis and Somali human rights monitors made similar allegations.36

34
35

Ibid.
Ibid. at 3.
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2. Holding the UN Troops Accountable for International Humanitarian Law Violations
Under the National Adjudicative Process37
(a) Belgium
In Belgium, judicial investigations were promptly opened into the allegations by the military
authorities (auditorat militaire) and resulted in two former paratroopers being tried before a
military court in June in connection with the treatment of the Somali boy held over the open
fire. On 30 June 1997 the court acquitted both men of the charges of assault and battery and of
using threats (coups et blessures volontaires avec menaces). The military prosecutor, who had
requested a sentence and a fine of 10,000 Belgian francs for each of the defendants reportedly
lodged an appeal. A sergeant was due to stand trial before a military court on 8 September
1997 in connection with the alleged forcible feeding of a Somali child and, reportedly, a
sergeant major was to stand trial in September 1997, apparently on suspicion of having killed
the Somali on whose body he was photographed urinating.38
Following the publication of further allegations and the photographs the Minister of Defence
ordered a broader, administrative, investigation, carried out by an army general heading the
Operational Command of the Belgian Ground Forces.39 In July 1997, Amnesty International
sought further information about several trials, which reportedly took place during 1994 and
1995 concerning soldiers prosecuted in connection with alleged human rights violations in
Somalia. The trials followed an inquiry into the conduct of Belgian forces in Somalia, carried
36

Amnesty International, ‘ITALY: A Briefing for the UN Committee Against Torture’ AI Index EUR 30/02/99,
(May 1995) 10.
37
National adjudicative process is used here to denote both civilian court process and military tribunals.
38
Amnesty International, above note 33, at 1.
39
Ibid.
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out in 1993 by a Commission of Inquiry composed of three regular army officers and a
civilian assistant to the Minister of Defence.40 The reports included:
•acquittal in December 1994 of two soldiers accused of manslaughter (homicide involontaire)
of two Somali men and a third accused of assaulting a Somali woman. The sentences were
apparently appealed.
•the issuing of verdicts in January 1995 following the trial of three soldiers in connection with
the fatal shooting of two Somali men and with alleged illegal trafficking in arms and ivory.
•suspended sentences to two soldiers who (while drunk) had kicked, punched and subjected a
handcuffed Somali prisoner to electric shocks.
•the trial in October 1995 of a group of 16 soldiers accused to varying degrees of threatening
and ill-treating Somali citizens mainly children, in spring 1993.
•on 31 October 1995 a military tribunal apparently acquitted nine officers, suspended
judgment (suspension du pronounce) in the case of another six and sentenced one officer to
eight days’ suspended imprisonment for subjecting two children to mock execution. 41
(b) Italy
In early June 1997, the Italian government announced that the army had opened an internal
administrative investigation into the conduct of the armed forces in Somalia, overseen by
army General Vannuchi, and that the military prosecutor’s office in Rome had opened judicial

40
41

Ibid at 2.
Ibid.
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investigations into specific alleged human rights violations. A number of cases were
subsequently transferred to civilian prosecutors for further investigation. In mid-June 1997 a
Ministry of Defence decree established a five-member government Commission of Inquiry to
look into the conduct of Italian troops, composed of military and civilian members and led by
Ettore Gallo, a former Constitutional Court President. Before submitting what was intended as
its conclusive report to the government in August 1997, the so-called Gallo Commission,
accompanied by members of the magistracy, gathered information in Italy, Ethiopia and
Kenya. It interviewed 141 people, including a small number of Somalis, but did not visit
Somalia.42
The Commission concluded that the overall conduct of the Italian troops in Somalia had been
good, that specific violations were carried out at the level of the ranks without involvement of
professional senior officers. Within days of the report being lodged, new information came to
light about further human rights violations by Italian troops in Somalia, accompanied by
claims that high ranking army officers had been aware of them and had not intervened to
prevent them. The Minister of Defence asked the Gallo Commission to reopen its inquiry. In
May 1998 the Commission submitted its second report

43

which indicated it had interviewed

11 Somalis flown to Italy in January 1997 but had not carried out on-site investigations in
Somalia. The Commission concluded that episodes of violence were ‘sporadic and localised’,
not ‘widespread and general’. Some middle-ranking officers were blamed for not having
known what the men in their charge were doing. The Commission addressed specific episodes

42
43

Amnesty International, above note 36 at 10.
Relazione Conclusiva, 26 May 1998.
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of alleged human rights violations by the armed forces in Somalia and laid them out on the
basis of credible, probably true, undecided as to the veracity and not considered credible.44
In a letter to Amnesty International dated 17 September 1997 the Minister of Justice stated
that Public Prosecutors attached to first instance courts in Livorno and Pescara (La Procure
della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Livorno e presso il Pretura di Pescara) had initiated
five proceedings in connection with Italian soldiers accused of various alleged offences,
including sexual assault of Somali women (the Minister did not specify the number of women
involved); deliberate infliction of injuries leading unintentionally to death of Somali citizens
(the Minister did not specify the number of citizens involved); the infliction of ill-treatment
and physical injuries(again, the Minister did not specify the number of Somali citizens
involved), and theft with violence from a Somali woman.45
When the Gallo Commission lodged its second report with the Italian government on 22 May
1998, the Ministry of Defence announced that by that date some five disciplinary sanctions
had been issued at ministry level (sanzioni di stato) and seven had been issued at army
command level (sanzioni di corpo). These sanctions apparently entailed punishments ranging
from formal reprimands to temporary suspension from service and confinement to barracks.46

44

Amnesty International, above note 36, at 10-11. It is interesting to note that the tenor of the report focused
singularly on the credibility of the alleged international humanitarian law violations and did not in any way focus
on the possible guilt of the Italian troops. Interesting, the Commission, made up of military officers as well as
jurists and chaired by a senior Italian judge did not use any legal standard notably the weight of evidence in
general relation to the particular offences alleged.
45
‘-atti di libidine violenta ed atti osceni in luogo pubblico (artt 521, 527, e 582 cp) in danno di donne somale
-omicidio preterintezionale in danno di cittadini Somali (artt 575, 582 e 584 cp)
-maltrattamenti, lesioni personali e violenza privata (artt 572, 582, 585, 576 e 610 cp)
-furto aggravato (artt 624 e 625 cp) in danno di cittadina somala’
46
Amnesty International, above note 36, at 14.
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3. The Failings of Justice in the Face of Competing National Political Interests and
International Justice Interests
While the nature of sentences issued to the various guilty troops in the two countries is of
interest, this article will not look into the legal adequacy of ministerial sanctions and army
command reprimands for troops charged with sexual assault, infliction of injuries leading to
unintentional death and torture of prisoners47 but will rather focus on general aspects of the
disciplinary processes in both countries that demonstrate that the investigation and subsequent
judicial proceedings were clearly biased in favour of the accused troops. At a glance, it is
unjust for a soldier accused of manslaughter not to be subjected to a criminal trial but to
instead get of with a ministerial sanction or a soldier accused of sexual assault to get of with
an army command reprimand.48
Firstly, in both governments, no consideration seems to have been given to a comprehensive
inquiry independent of the military, into alleged human rights abuses in order to ensure a
demonstrably impartial examination of facts as advocated under the UN Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment49 and under the
UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and
47

Ibid. at 13 which reports the general contents of a letter dated September 17, 1997 from the Italian Minister
of Justice in response to Amnesty International inquiries for specifics of criminal proceedings undertaken and
copies of the verdicts. See also, Amnesty International Report 1999: Italy (1999) 3.
48
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Summary Executions.50 Both countries are signatories to the former and come within the
auspices of the latter as members of the UN. Instead, there was a combination of civilian and
military mechanisms without delineation as to criteria in determining investigative and/or
sentencing scope of cases by the military and civilian adjudicative mechanisms especially
with regard to matters of a criminal nature. Essentially, then, a loophole was created that in
the writer’s opinion allowed troops who should have been subject to criminal trial for inter
alia manslaughter, sexual assault, etc to be subjected to the lower standard within the
framework of the military internal disciplinary mechanism.51 This procedure facilitated the
accused to escape justice with reprimands, fines, and dishonourable discharge.
Secondly, the biases of investigations need to be discussed. Military-high ranking generals
and civilian personnel-government bureaucrats, were involved as investigators. Both groups
had certain specific interests to protect. For the military, the armed forces reputation was at
stake, for the government bureaucrats, the country’s international image. For instance, the
Gallo Commission in its first report concluded that the overall conduct of the Italian troops
had been good, it exonerated senior professional officers in its first report. However,
subsequent evidence implicated the officers who had been exonerated.52 Even then, the
Commission in its second report submitted in broad and vague terms that ‘[a]t the highest
level ,[which the Commission did not define] there was an inability to foresee that certain
events might occur and a failure to make checks which might have ensured that repeatedly-

1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish torture (Article 2), 1981 African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (Article 5).
50
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given orders and instructions were applied’. Further the Commission did not bother to carry
on-site investigations in Somalia even in light of the new evidence and allegations.53
Thirdly, most of the trials were in military courts. While it is beyond the scope of this article
to delve into the criminal law structure of the two countries, the writer will state that
generally, the military courts ruled on matters based on internal military disciplinary
procedures and did not refer cases of a criminal nature to civilian courts for criminal trials
which would entail criminal penalties. Thus, the soldiers faced the tribunals most probably on
charges of failing to conduct themselves according to the army manual rather than the
violation of human rights of their victims. Proof of this as essentially an internal disciplinary
matter seems to be borne out by the nature of sentences-temporary suspension of service,
confinement to barracks and army command reprimands.54 Further, there is no information to
suggest that any of the troops’ victims or other witnesses (Somali citizens) ever appeared
before the military tribunals even though it was within the power of the respective
governments to trace a good number of them down and bring them for testimony before the
tribunals.
Lastly, there seemed to be a broader governmental conspiracy in the sense that that all briefs
and ministerial reports were long on recommendations but short on specific details. For
instance on 8 July 1997 the Belgian Minister of Defence highlighted to parliament certain
findings. The report recommended better selection of candidates, improved training, including
educating soldiers and disseminating information on humanitarian law. It also indicated that
excessive delays in disciplinary proceedings and a problem of alcohol abuse in the army
53
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needed to be addressed. The minister of Defence added that he wished to set up an
independent inquiry on racism within the army.55 Requests by concerned parties for
information on specificity of verdicts issued elicited no response or were referred to the
Byzantine maze of government bureaucracy.56 Evidently, the governments were more eager to
give the impression that something was being done rather than affirmative action to ensure
proper prosecution of accused troops. For instance in a letter dated 17 September 1997, by
Italy’s Minister of Justice in response to Amnesty International’s call for an effective
complaints mechanism for Somalis as the present mechanism was deemed inadequate, the
Minister stated ‘in the Italian system anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, is allowed access
to the justice system in order to protect their own interests whether in the civil or criminal
area.’57 How the affected Somalis living in a country decimated by civil strife and without a
central government were expected to gain access to Italy’s justice system is left to
imagination. The trials that did take place were evidently a public relations exercise that made
a mockery of justice.

III.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: HOW CAN THE UN BE HELD
ACCOUNTABLE FOR VIOLATIONS BY ITS FORCES?

This section of the article is an inquiry into whether the United Nations can be held
accountable for the violation of the international humanitarian law by forces under its
command during Security Council authorised action to maintain international peace and
54
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security.58 Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
and Land59 lays down the qualifications of ‘belligerents,’ that of groups entitled to take part in
armed conflict. Key among this is command, distinctive emblem, open bearing of arms and
the requirement of adherence to the laws and customs of war. It is important to bear in mind
that the Hague Laws are part of customary international law.60 While it is easy for
international armed forces acting under the auspices of the UN to fulfil this criteria, an
important ingredient is whether they qualify to be classed as ‘belligerents’ in their operations.
The important thing though to be borne in mind is that in peace enforcement, UN troops do
militarily intervene in the territory of States notwithstanding that they do so without the
intention of being active combatants. The issue of belligerence of UN operations will be
considered in the next part of the article which discusses whether the laws of war which are
binding upon the States who are members of the United Nations, are binding as well upon the
Organisation itself.

2. The Laws of War
An Overview of The Hague and Geneva Regimes
The rules of Public International Law regulating the conduct of those armed conflicts defined
57
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as ‘international’ are often referred to as the jus in bello, and are distinguished from the jus ad
bellum, which regulates and restricts the rights of international legal entities (particularly
States) to use armed force against one another.61The Hague and Geneva Conventions form the
core of international humanitarian law.

The Hague and Geneva Conventions are a series of treaties which state the laws of war as
general principles of conduct.62 Treaties such as the Hague and Geneva conventions, and
military manuals in various States are not, therefore, the sources of the laws of war, but rather
the codification of customary international law.63 Thus, although non-signatory nations are
not bound by the precise wording and detailed prescriptions of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, they are regarded as bound by the customary laws of war from which the
treaties are derived.64
60
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The Hague and Geneva Conventions embody the laws of war, referred to as the jus in bello.
The Hague Conventions are a series of treaties concluded at the Hague in 1907, which
primarily regulate the behaviour of belligerents in war and neutrality,65 whereas the Geneva
Conventions are a series of treaties concluded in Geneva between 1864 and 1949, which
concern the protection of the victims of armed conflict.66 In 1977 two Protocols to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which further developed the protection of victims in international armed
conflicts and expanded protection to victims of non-international armed conflict, were opened
for signature. Whether or not these two additional protocols have been incorporated into the
corpus of international customary law is still a subject of intense debate.67

Together, the Hague and Geneva Conventions embody the rules which govern the (1) laws on
the use and types of weapons; (2) laws on warfare, including rules on permissible tactics and

‘principles of the law of nations,’ which are then described in the same words used in the Hague Convention.
The International Military Tribunal overseeing the Nuremberg Trials echoed a similar viewpoint: ‘The law of
war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of States which gradually obtained
universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice…This law is not static, but by continual
adaptation follows the needs for a changing world.’ Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.
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strategies on legitimate targets; and (3) humanitarian rules.68 These rules attempt to limit, in
the name of humanity, the conduct which is directly related to war hostilities in progress
between organised belligerent forces to that which is actually necessary for military
purposes.69And, although the traditional laws of war were understood in pre-modernised
international law to apply essentially between States, under the modern international law,
embodied in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the jus in bello, similar to other parts of the
law, applies in certain circumstances to other recognised entities as well. For example, the
effective realities made it necessary to subject conflicts within States to the jus in bello on the
basis of subjective recognition of rebel forces as belligerents.70

An Overview of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals
Two international tribunals were established following World War II, at Nuremberg and
Tokyo to try major war criminals. The decision of the Allies in World War II to try individual
Nazis before the IMT for violations of international law was the turning point in modern
history concerning the relationship between individuals and international law.71 They carved
out in stone the basic international criminal law philosophy that even in the international
arena with a multitude of different entities and collectivities, ‘[c]rimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’72

68

I. D. De Lupis, The Law of War (1987) 129.
Taylor, above note 62 at 30, 34.
70
See Austin, above note 61 at 765.
71
M. W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law (1993) 246.
72
Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal at Nuremberg. See Taylor, above note 62, at 78-94.
69

23

It is important to note that the principles by which the above tribunals guided themselves were
recognised in 1946 by the General Assembly of the United Nations as principles of
substantive and procedural international criminal law.73 The judgments of the Nuremberg
Tribunal were meant to establish plainly and forcefully that the rules of public international
law should and do apply to individuals; they were also intended to demonstrate that the
protection of human rights was too important a matter to be left entirely to States, a
proposition already enunciated in the Preamble and Article 55 of the Charter of the United
Nations.

Efforts to prosecute individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes did not end
with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. Sadly, however, more than forty years were to
elapse before the community of nations revisited the issue of enforcement of international
criminal law by international judicial process. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council
called for the establishment of an ad hoc international war-crimes tribunal to prosecute those
accused of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia.74 It was established as an enforcement
measure under the binding authority of Chapter VII, rather than through a treaty which would
have created an international criminal court whose jurisdiction would be subject to the
consent of the States concerned.75 Subsequently, a second international criminal tribunal
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modelled along that of the former Yugoslavia was established for Rwanda.76 The
establishment of the tribunals also invoked a response from the Security Council to move
forward on the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.77 This two tribunals
played an important role in fuelling the drive to the permanent International Criminal Court78
as they stood as a living testimony to the legal and technical viability of judicial enforcement
of international humanitarian law.

3. The Applicability of the Laws of War to the United Nations?
(a) The International Legal Personality of the United Nations
For the United Nations to be held responsible for a violation of the laws of war, it must
possess sufficient international legal personality. Legal personality is possessed by those
entities with the status of being capable of bearing legal rights and duties in a given legal
system.79 States are the traditional subjects of international law based on the principle of
‘territorial sovereignty.’80 In the twentieth century, international organisations have been
widely received as having international legal personality.81 A State, or other international
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legal person, may be held responsible only to the extent that it has rights and duties which it is
free to exercise; and some have more than others.82

Just as a State has the right under international law to assert an international claim for
damages when another State fails to live up to certain minimum standards for safety of its
nationals, vis-a-vis forces representing the United Nations, the Organisation assumes
responsibility only to the extent that such forces become an organ of the UN and therefore
subject to its exclusive operational control.83 Thus, when in 1948 a Swedish national acting as
a United Nations mediator in the Middle East was killed while performing his UN duties in
Palestine, the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of The United Nations, held that if in the performance of his
duties, an agent of the UN suffers injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a
State, the United Nations as an organisation has the capacity to bring an international claim
against the responsible de jure or de facto Government with a view to obtaining the reparation
due in respect of damage caused to the victim or to his successors in title.

84

This case,

therefore, established that the United Nations has the capacity to bring a claim with a view of
obtaining reparations due in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations, and to the
victim or to persons entitled through him, regardless of whether the respondent State is a
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member of the UN. In reaching this decision the Court concluded that the United Nations is
an international person, a subject of international law capable of possessing international
rights and duties with the capacity to maintain its right by bringing international claims.85

Thus, it has been established that the United Nations has sufficient international legal
personality to bring a claim against one of its Members which has caused injury to it by
breach of the State's international obligation towards it. Rights are not conferred without
corresponding duties.86 Thus, under the theory of reciprocity, along with the right to bring an
international claim, the UN also has the responsibility to be held responsible under
international law for the actions of its agents.87 One must keep in mind, however, that where a
State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law,
the rights and duties of an entity, such as the United Nations, must depend upon its purposes
and functions as specified or implied in its Charter and as developed in practice.88 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has determined that the United Nations
could not carry out the intentions of its founders without the right to bring an international
claim.89 Thus, when considering whether the UN has sufficient international personality to be
held responsible for the laws of war, one must consider whether the functions of the United
Nations are such that they could not be effectively discharged without such a corresponding
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obligation.90

The applicability of the laws of war to the United Nations does not, however, depend solely
on the capacity of the UN to be held responsible under international law. When viewed with
the powers in Chapter VII action there is a (contentious) case to be made that the UN has both
the capacity and an obligation to engage in international humanitarian law conventions
regulating armed forces.

91

The UN, in addition to being a subject of international law, must

be a direct and intended addressee of the rights and duties designated in the laws of war.92 The
following section discusses to what extent the United Nations peacekeeping forces should be
bound by the laws of war.

(b). The Belligerent Status of the United Nations
The laws of war as discussed above are codified in international treaties known as the Hague
and Geneva Conventions. The parties (signatory States) to the conventions are bound by the
precise wording of these treaties, and the non-signatory States are bound by the customary
international law from which the treaties are derived. In addition, we have seen that under the
Nuremberg principles, individuals may also be held responsible for the violation of such laws,
regardless of the fact of whether they acted as agents of a signatory State. The problem
regarding the applicability of the laws of war to the United Nations arises from the fact that
the peacekeeping forces are agents, not of a belligerent party/State in the traditional sense, but
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of an international organisation whose role is to maintain and enforce peace.93

In a report entitled ‘Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?’
presented to the American Society of International Law in 1952 by the Committee on the
Study of the Legal Problems of the United Nations, its Chairman (Clyde Eagleton), stated
that: ‘[a] war is fought by a State for its own national interest; United Nations enforcement
action is on behalf of order and peace among nations . . . War as between States of equal legal
status has in the past been regarded as honourable; the use of force against the United Nations
is now to be regarded as an offence against all Members.’ The Eagleton committee concluded
in its report that due to the different nature of the use of force by the United Nations to
restrain aggression from war-making by a State, the United Nations should not feel bound by
all the laws of war, but should select such of the laws of war as may seem to fit its purposes.94
It is maintained by some that acceptance of the Charter by Member States meant acceptance
by them of the superior legal position of the United Nations as regards the use of force and
that, consequently, the United Nations may apply such rules as it wishes.95 This conclusion
has found little support and has subsequently been severely criticised. This writer shares the
opinion of those who argue that the law governing the conduct of warfare arises from a
fundamental humanitarian need and was not simply framed as a set of rules to permit the
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playing of a game of 'war' between two States.96

In recognition of the fact that the law of war has a legitimate role to play whenever hostilities
exist, its application in the past has not been confined to declared war between States.97 Under
common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the laws of war are made applicable
not only to all cases of declared war between the parties, but to all other armed conflicts as
well. Similarly, its application in the present should not be confined to ‘belligerents’ in the
strictest sense, but to any organised party involved in a conflict. The numerous States that
have signed and ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have incorporated them within the
corpus of their legal system as part of the 'Law of the Land'. Therefore the argument that their
troops acting under the auspices of the United Nations, are not participating in an 'armed
conflict' ‘would require the most ingenious casuistry’.98 The UN as an organisation can
command and deploy forces, which themselves will or may, be engaged in combat or use of
force as authorised by the UN. From the beginning, the UN was projected as a potential
combatant and/or occupying force. This is reflected in Article 1 and Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, and, in particular, in the unutilised provisions of Articles 43-50, by which States
were to assign military forces to the UN.99
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If the United Nations finds its distinction in its status as a superior legal and moral entity, it
should be held to an even higher standard than those embodied in the current laws of war. The
argument that the same laws of war should not be applied to all belligerents stems from the
postulate that laws of war should discriminate between the legal and illegal belligerent.100 The
proposition that the superior status of the UN exempts it from being bound by the laws of war
rests on the fact that when the UN acts, it is acting under the consensus of the international
community.101

The new allegiance among ‘East’102 and ‘West’ has created an increased opportunity for
international consensus on methods for keeping the peace. It has also prompted the heads of
State or governments of the permanent members of the Security Council to pledge increased
support to the United Nations towards the end of creating a more effective United
Nations.103If one were to conclude that the laws of war do not apply to the United Nations
because of its unique character, it would mean that as the ‘Big Five’104 transfer their sovereign
power over their troops to the United Nations, in an effort to rely on the UN as a means to
their end, they would simultaneously be exempting those troops from adherence to the laws of
established. In February 1946, the security Council directed the MSC to devise plans for the force as stipulated
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war. However, simply because those troops are acting on behalf of the international
community (as opposed to a State) and supposedly have the broader aim of enforcing or
maintaining peace, rather than destroying an enemy to gain political or territorial control, does
not mean that the unregulated conduct of those troops presents any less of a danger to
humanity.

The lack of a method for authoritatively and effectively determining that a situation justifies
the application of the laws of war is a major weakness of the contemporary laws. However,
with regard to UN forces, the Secretary-General’s Bulletin105 marks an important milestone in
recognising that the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are
applicable to UN forces in situations of armed conflict when they are engaged as active
combatants, enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is
permitted in self-defence.106 Given the binding nature of Security Council resolutions as a
type of lex societatis107 on members of the UN, the Security Council should avoid routinely
adopting mandates that do not provide militarily meaningful guidelines to missions and which
do not give opportunity for systematic input by troop-contributing States to the design of the
mandate. Possibility exists to extend the simple broad mandate approach to one that endorses
or promulgates more prescriptive guidelines for key aspects of UN operations, particularly
rules of engagement.
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4. International Humanitarian Law Violations by UN Troops: Proposed Method for
International Accountability
Given the importance of the assurance that any party involved in hostile conflict adheres to
the humanitarian rules set forth in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, regardless of the
nature of their involvement, or their particular status in international law, the United Nations
needs to take positive action to bind itself to both sets of Conventions. Although there is a
strong argument that there is no need to take such an action since the United Nations is bound
by the customary rules embodied in the Conventions, positive steps taken to bind itself to the
agreements will guarantee that the United Nations is willing to hold its troops to the same
standards it wishes to hold its members. The United Nations should take advantage of its
treaty making power to become a signatory party to the treaties.108 Article 1 of the UN
Charter tasks the organisation to promote and encourage respect for human rights. Such
promotion and encouragement will hardly be served by the organisation itself attempting to
avoid responsibility in this area.

This article has previously discussed that the United Nations has sufficient international
personality to either bring or defend a claim for the breach of an international obligation.
Another important aspect of international personality is treaty-making capacity. Although all
entities having treaty- making capacity necessarily have international personality, all
international persons do not necessarily have treaty-making capacity.109 The United Nations,
however, has such capacity. Although article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
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Treaties states that the Convention applies to treaties between States, 110 the International Law
Commission, charged with recommending the proposed codification of the Convention,
explained that the fact that the scope is so defined is not intended in any way to deny that
other subjects of international law, such as international organisations, may conclude
treaties.111 This is reflected in Article 3 of the Convention which States that ‘[t]he fact that the
present Convention does not apply to international agreements concluded between States and
other subjects of international law . . . shall not affect the legal force of such
agreements.’112Thus, the United Nations, as an international organisation, does have the
capacity to conclude treaties.113 This capacity has been recognised in the Vienna Convention
on Law of Treaties Between States and International Organisations or Between International
Organisations114 which, though not yet in force, recognises that such capacity is necessary for
international organisations to perform their functions and fulfil their purposes.115

Despite the fact that the United Nations has the capacity to conclude a treaty, whether the
United Nations has the capacity to be a member of the particular treaties which make up the
laws of war must still be determined.116The intent of the drafters of the Conventions was to
limit a belligerent's conduct, in the name of humanity, to that which is actually necessary for
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military purposes.117 As a means to achieving their humanitarian ends, the drafters did not
limit the application of the rules to ‘States’.118 For example, rebel forces are considered
belligerents. In Peck's opinion, if the parties to the Conventions are willing to treat
individuals, under the Nuremberg principles, as subjects of international law in order to reach
their humanitarian goals, it can hardly be argued that an international organisation, which
represents a significant portion of the international community, should not also be regarded as
an intended subject of those rules when it is involved in an armed conflict of an international
and warlike character or in a conflict that becomes internationalised due to its intervention.119
Therefore, technically the UN has the capacity to formally accede to the Conventions. The
eligibility of the UN to formally accede to the Hague and Geneva Conventions rests on the
consent of the current parties to the treaties.120 For example, each of the Geneva Conventions
expressly provides that accession is open only to ‘Powers’.121 Some writers have concluded
that although the term ‘Power’ or, ‘Puissance’ is a term which is normally used in treaties
synonymously with ‘States,’ it does not preclude other subjects of international law which
may be parties to an armed conflict of an international and warlike character, and thus the
UN, too, is a ‘Power’.122 Supporting this assertion is the fact that the Conventions are
concerned with ‘military power’ and the protection to be afforded to victims of conflict. The
Conventions are ‘people-oriented’ not ‘territory-oriented’, with all the consequential debates
that might arise concerning sovereignty and State relations. The term ‘Power’ in the

117

Taylor, above note 62, at 34.
See Austin, above note 61, at 765.
119
Peck, above note 86 at 310.
120
See Simmonds, above note 82, at 182.
121
Id. at 195.
122
F. Seyersted, Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental organisations. Do Their Capacities
really Depend on their Constitutions? (1963) 15-21 cited in Simmonds, above note 73, at 182. Cf. Simmonds at
183.
118

35

Conventions would be argued to encompass UN forces as a ‘military power’, party to a
conflict, or an occupying power where it has recognised forces under a chain of command
responsible to UN Headquarters in New York.

Although the UN may have the capacity to formally accede to the Conventions, its
willingness to enforce the laws of war along its chain of command is not enough.123 It is a
recognised principle of the customary laws of war that an entity must also have the ability to
compel its Commander and its Force to act lawfully.124 It would seem that the argument for
the UN not being held accountable for international humanitarian law violations by its
peacekeepers, lies in the fact that the rank-and-file soldiers in the missions do not swear
allegiance to the UN, the troops wear their national uniforms and the governments retain
discretion as to the number and nature of command for their troops.125 It is important to note
that while the Security Council cannot be said to have total command over UN forces, it has
full authority as the force commander is under the direct authority of the UN SecretaryGeneral or his Special Representative. In addition, the troops act under the UN flag, bear UN
insignia and that the Security Council creates and defines the missions under its Chapter VII
powers: hence the troops are in essence an instrument of the Security Council as they are
under an obligation to fulfil the specific mandate drawn up the Security Council and to change
their military operations in accordance with the dictates of the Council.
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The seeming dichotomy between the Commander's responsibility for ordering the troops and
the Participating State's responsibility for discipline raises serious questions concerning the
requisite responsibility along the entire chain of command which the customary laws of war
demand.126A possible solution for the assurance that such enforcement is mandatory would be
for the UN to designate as its agent for the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the
Conventions, one or more of the Members who have contributed national contingents to the
Force.127 Another possibility, however, is simply to assure that no mandate or regulation ever
leaves the Participating State's responsibility to discipline its nationals up to its own discretion
which happens to be the position adopted by the UN.128 This system has already failed three
times in the 1990s.129 The subordination of international justice interests by national political
interests in these cases, highlighted the unwillingness of States to investigate and prosecute its
servants and/or agents.

III.

THE UN AS A PARTY TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
CONVENTIONS AND THE ROME STATUTE PROVISIONS

A. Triggering Mechanisms
This section of the article looks generally at the provisions of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (hereafter the ICC)130 in so far as they relate to violations of laws
of war and the interplay of national interests as well as international justice interests. It gives a
the participating State for that purpose. This is reaffirmed in section 4 of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, above
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general insight into the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction with regard to the issue of UN
forces. It is necessary to state that the International Criminal Court has automatic, or inherent
jurisdiction over all core crimes131 when the alleged crime is committed on the territory of a
State party or when the accused is a national of a State party. The Court’s jurisdiction is thus
two-fold.

The Court's jurisdiction can be 'triggered' in one of three ways. The Court may exercise
jurisdiction with respect to the crimes in the Statute if a situation is referred to the Prosecutor:
(1) by the Security Council acting pursuant to its Chapter VII powers under the Charter of the
United Nations; (2) by a State Party to the Statute; or (3) by the Prosecutor acting proprio
motu - on their own initiative - following an independent investigation.132 Referrals by States
Parties and the Prosecutor acting in an independent capacity are subject to additional
limitations before the Court will be permitted to exercise its jurisdiction.

1. Security Council Referral
Pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if '[a]
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations.' This provision, in effect, acknowledges the primacy afforded to the Security Council
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in maintaining international peace and security.133 The Security Council has always had a
wide range of powers under the Charter to determine and respond to threats to international
peace.134 Most significant is Article 42 which authorises the Council to impose its decisions
through the use of force where necessary to restore international stability.135

In light of this pre-eminence of the constitutional authority of the Security Council, and
particularly of the five permanent members who have the power of veto over Council
decisions, all States recognised, albeit reluctantly in some cases, that the Rome Statute could
not diminish the UN Security Council's constitutional authority. At least four of the five
permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, China, France and the Russian
Federation) advocated strongly for the power to veto prosecutions which involved situations
of which the Council was seized under Chapter VII of the Charter.136 Such a provision would
have granted inordinate influence over the independence of the Court to members of the
Council . If such a provision had been included, a member of the Council could, potentially,
have precluded the Court from dealing with a case by simply including the situation on the
agenda of the Council. Vesting the Security Council with power to control the Court's docket
would have jeopardised the Court's judicial independence and politicised its work. Inevitably,
it is unlikely that the ICC would ever have been able to prosecute any member of a UN force
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as the Security Council would have viewed this as an interference by the ICC in its actions
exercised in accordance with its authority to maintain international peace and security.

The final provision of the Rome Statute rather than prohibit the Court from investigating a
matter being dealt with by the Security Council, shifts the onus onto the Security Council to
affirmatively halt an investigation. Article 16 provides that no prosecution may be
commenced for twelve months where the Security Council has adopted a resolution under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter to that effect. Permanent members of the Security Council,
therefore, do not possess the right to obstruct an ICC investigation by exercising an individual
power of veto. Rather, the Security Council as a whole must take an affirmative step by
passing a resolution should it wish to prevent the commencement of a prosecution. In the
absence of veto power by the Security Council over the ICC, one may hazard a fair rule of
thumb, that everytime UN forces commit violations of international humanitarian law, they
open themselves up to the possibility of investigation and prosecution by the ICC.

2. State Party Complaint
The Court will also be able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of an alleged crime under the
Statute where a referral is made by a State Party in accordance with article 14.137 A State
Party is required , as far as possible to, provide supporting documentation specifying the
relevant circumstances for its referral. As the experience of human rights treaty bodies has
demonstrated, mechanisms which provide for State-based complaint procedures have been
greatly under-utilised to date because States are reticent to initiate proceedings against other
137
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States or their nationals due to the political and diplomatic ramifications of doing so.138 Even
within the new regime of the ICC, it is unlikely that this method will be any popular. States
are more inclined to make decisions based on political rather than judicial interests whenever
the issue of investigation and prosecution of their troops by the ICC arises.

3. Independent Investigation by the Prosecutor
The Rome Statute includes a provision for the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction based on a
Prosecutor with independent powers of investigation.139The Prosecutor is empowered under
the Statute to receive information on potential crimes from a variety of sources including
States, organs of the United Nations, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations,
and 'other reliable sources'.140This is perhaps the strongest feature of the ICC as an
independent and autonomous penal court that will not be riddled with political considerations
rather than considerations of upholding international justice. The Security Council has no
power to review the Prosecutor’s case docket. The proprio motu power is a useful tool that
deflects a potential abuse of power by the veto of permanent members of the Security Council
predicated on national interests and political motivations.

There are a number of provisions in the Statute placing safeguards on prosecutorial discretion
to prevent or limit the likelihood of politically-motivated complaints. The Prosecutor must
gain the authorisation of the Pre-Trial Chamber before proceeding with an investigation.141
The Pre-Trial Chamber is obliged to determine that there is a reasonable basis to proceed and
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that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.142 This provision is viewed by its
advocates as an important victory in the establishment of a truly independent court. It is on
this plane that the ICC will have authority to investigate and prosecute UN troops for
international humanitarian law violations, even over the nationals of non-party States. It is
significant that for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over an accused person, it is not necessary
for both the territorial State and national State to be party to the Statute. It is enough that one
of them is.143 This eliminates the possibility of a State of a national controlling the Court’s
jurisdiction.

B.

Criminal Jurisdiction and Mandate

This section of the article focuses on war crimes as provided for in the Rome Statute as this
category of crimes encompasses international humanitarian law violations that are the focus
of this article. This section discusses issues concerning crimes against humanity to contrast
and highlight the differences in judicial discretion by the Court in relation to these two
categories of crimes. Crimes against humanity are mentioned in Article 5 of the Rome Statute
and enunciated in Article 7. The drafting of a new definition of crimes against humanity
provided a unique opportunity to develop international criminal law on the subject. The
provision consists of a chapeau which outlines the threshold requirements to be fulfilled
before certain acts are considered a crime against humanity and an enumerated list of acts
which can constitute the crime. Article 7(2) also includes a list of clarifications on the
meaning of specific words or phrases in Article 7(l) and they must be read conjunctively in
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any interpretation of the related provisions in paragraph 1.

The Rome Statute makes a significant contribution to international jurisprudence concerning
the formulation of torture and gender-specific sexual offences. The Statute also includes a
new ground of persecution on the basis of gender. However, the provision is accompanied by
a limitation that such persecution must be committed in conjunction with another crime under
the Statute.144 Additionally, rape and other acts of sexual violence can be separately
prosecuted under the Rome Statute as war crimes involving grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, which include torture, inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health,145 The definition of torture in Article 7(2)(e) no longer
requires the involvement of a public official in contrast to the definition of torture in Article 1
of the UN Convention on Torture.146

In relation to war crimes, unanimity of opinion did exist for the inclusion of grave breaches of
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 but beyond that specific category of war crimes,
widespread disagreement emerged in two key areas as to: (1) whether to include, and if so
precisely which, acts other than the grave breaches of the 1949 Conventions committed in the
context of international armed conflicts; and, (2) whether to include, and if so which, acts
committed in the context of non-international armed conflicts. The substantive provisions of
144
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Article 8 of the Rome Statute are now grouped in four distinct sections in order from the least
to the most contentious.147 Of significance are sub-paragraphs (2)(c) and 2(e) of Article 8
which incorporate the lists of acts which can constitute war crimes within non-international
armed conflicts. Article 8(2)(c) incorporates serious violations of Common Article 3 while the
list of acts in article 8(2)(e) is drawn extensively, but not exclusively, from Additional
Protocol II.148

C. Threshold Level of Gravity
The Rome Statute does not constitute codification of international criminal law. Instead, the
exercise in relation to substantive crimes at the diplomatic conference was to negotiate the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the new Court which would only deal with 'the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community'.149Thus there was need to set a general
threshold level for crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. Along with the constitutional
authority of the UN Security Council over the Court's docket in cases coming under its
exercise of UN Charter Chapter VII, the threshold level of gravity poses the second biggest
obstacle to an exercise of authority by the Court over UN troops.

Some delegations argued in Rome that, since the Court was intended only to exercise
jurisdiction over the most serious international crimes, the definition of war crimes ought to
include a threshold level of gravity. Other delegations objected to this proposal on the grounds
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that the Court ought to be able to exercise a discretion about the exercise of its jurisdiction
over an alleged war crime.

150

Article 8(l) provides an indicative threshold such that '[t]he

Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.'151 The use of the term
'in particular' leaves open the possibility that the Court could exercise its jurisdiction in
respect of a single act constituting a war crime within one or other of the acts listed in article
8(2).152 The possibility of a prosecution for a single act constituting a war crime pursuant to
Article 8 stands in marked contrast to the threshold level of gravity for a crime against
humanity.

With regard to the threshold level of gravity for inhumane acts to qualify as crimes against
humanity, the two accepted indices of the gravity of alleged acts were 'widespread' and
'systematic'. 'Widespread' relates to the scale of an attack against a civilian population - not an
isolated act but large scale action directed against multiple victims. 'Systematic', on the other
hand, carries a connotation of premeditation by an organised group - an attack carefully
planned and undertaken as part of a common policy. Article 7(l) provides that the particular
acts must have been 'committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population' where such an attack is understood to mean 'a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph I against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit such
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attack'.153 This formulation therefore effectively excludes isolated and single acts as crimes
against humanity. While the prosecution will not be required to prove that the alleged acts
were both widespread and systematic, it will now be insufficient merely to prove one or the
other indicia to constitute an indictable crime against humanity. One hopes that it will not be
more difficult for the prosecution to prove the elements of a crime against humanity in
particular cases.154

Thus it will be possible to prosecute individual UN troops for violations of international
humanitarian law under war crimes without the constraints involved in the high threshold
level required to prosecute for crimes against humanity. It is possible that in many cases, an
act can fall under the category of crime against humanity or a war crime. But as the text of the
Court’s provisions provide, the particular case’s classification test is premised on two indices,
‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’. Thus, there is, in effect, a lower threshold level in war crimes
that allows the prosecution of single and isolated incidents of violations as discussed above. It
is unlikely that the high threshold level for crimes against humanity can be realistically
fulfilled in the prosecution of UN troops for violations of international humanitarian law. This
is so because the acts committed by UN troops tend to be isolated and sporadic acts of
military indiscipline or indifference. Even when multiple, these incidents are not part of a
‘large scale action’ or ‘form part of a common policy’, instead these occurr as a result of
‘overzealous’ actions of the UN troops.
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D National Interests vis-a-vis International Justice Interests in The Rome Statute
State-Consent Regime
The Security Council’s referral of a situation to the Court overrides any requirement of the
consent of a relevant State as a precondition for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction: that
authority is inherent in the Council's constitutional authority under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. However, in respect of cases initiated either by a complaint from a State Party or on
the basis of an independent investigation on the part of the Prosecutor, the Court does not
exercise compulsory jurisdiction. Instead, the Rome Statute requires the consent of either the
territorial State or the State of the accused's nationality for the case to proceed.155 If either
Territorial State or the State of nationality are not States Parties to the Statute, it is possible
for one or other of them to extend ad hoc consent to allow the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction in a particular case.156 It should be recognised that this State consent regime was
the biggest stumbling block to US support157 for the Rome Statute. The US delegation insisted
that the consent of both the territorial State and the State of nationality was critical to the
credibility of the Court. Essentially, the Court’s jurisdiction may be exercised over any
person anywhere if that person is a national of a State party or committed a crime on the
territory of a State Party. A non-State party may consent on an ad hoc basis to the Court’s
jurisdiction where necessary. Thus, if a territorial State (party or non-party) is willing to
subject itself to the tribunal, that suffices to confer the Court’s jurisdiction over any national.

Complementarity
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Although the Rome Statute does not use the term 'complementarity', the Preamble and Article
1 describe the new Court as a 'complement' to existing national courts and processes158 hence the coining of the term 'complementarity'. The agreed formula in the Rome Statute is
that a State with jurisdictional competence has the first right to institute proceedings unless
the ICC decides that the State 'is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation
or prosecution .’ The assumption in Rome was that such a determination would be
straightforward for the ICC in either of two situations: (1) where the State, for whatever
reason, chooses not to exercise its jurisdictional competence - ‘the unwilling State’; or (2)
where the State's legal and administrative structures have completely broken down.

The complementarity referred to in the statute strives to harmonise, wherever possible,
multiple and competing sources of jurisdiction over international crimes. It developed as a
principled and pragmatic way to accommodate the conflicting imperatives of State
sovereignty and the need for a permanent international institution to end impunities for
atrocities at a time of global proliferation of localised armed conflict. As suggested by its
name it ensures that the ICC complements rather than replaces, national judicial systems. In
recognising States concurrent jurisdiction over serious violations of international law, the
Court is expected to strengthen national enforcement of human rights and human rights
norms.

A critical issue of concern though is that, in the context of a permanent ICC, there seems little
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justification for a separate regime for Security Council referrals, which undermines the
Court’s complementary juridical underpinning and its support. While acknowledging that the
ICC has no authority to alter the criteria for the exercise of the Security Council’s Chapter VII
powers, the lack of parallel complementarity criteria for Security Council referrals to the
Court raises the spectre of a Court reduced on some level to permanent institutionalised
Security Council Ad-Hoc-ism, which re-enshrines Security Council hegemony. This would reintroduce the Security Council’s power and pave way for national interests of States to
override international justice interests. In this scenario, the prosecution of UN troops would
never materialise. Preferably and ideally, the ICC should be for a formally independent
institution.

Admissibility
Criteria concerning admissibility and procedures that must be followed are spelled out in
Articles 17 and 18, and are applied in conjunction with the double jeopardy principles of
Article 20. The Statute establishes a presumption of inadmissibility whenever a State is
exercising, or has exercised, its national jurisdiction over a case. Good faith is both presumed
and expected in the national adjudication of such cases, whatever their outcome subject to the
ne bis idem provision.159 The standard for admissibility is articulated as a State’s
unwillingness or inability to genuinely carry out an investigation or a prosecution. This
standard is applied to prospective and ongoing investigations and prosecutions as well as a
State’s decision not to go forward with a prosecution after conducting an investigation. If a
State will not or genuinely cannot conduct a good faith investigation or prosecution, then the
159
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ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the case. This is to prevent a State from blocking the
Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of its own assertion of a bona fide process or the existence of
jurisdiction that confers national primacy to it. It should be noted that for the purposes of
articulating the language of admissibility, what is being reviewed is a ‘case’ not a ‘situation.’
In other words, Article 17 presumes that the Prosecutor has already made a determination that
sufficient evidence exists to charge at least one individual with the commission of a crime or
crimes, and that a State’s investigation and/or prosecution corresponds (at least) to that
particular individual.

Immunities
In recognising that in matters of international law, ‘individuals have international duties
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State’,
Article 27 of the Rome Statute provides against ‘immunities and procedural rules which may
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international
law’(emphasis added) which may bar the Court from exercising jurisdiction over such a
person. An unresolved but controversial issue that is related to jurisdiction is the question of
amnesties and pardons that States from time to time grant to perpetrators within the Court’s
mandate.160Yet another issue that appears unresolved is the status of forces agreements the
UN may from time to time enter into with States with regard to the presence of UN forces on
the State’s territory.
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V.CONCLUSION
The documented international humanitarian law violations by troops participating in UN
military operations demonstrate the need-[now that the United Nations has been given a
breath of new life and may become the ‘tool’ for enforcing or maintaining peace]- to consider
whether the UN can be held accountable for violations by its troops of laws of war.
Traditionally international humanitarian laws have regulated the conduct of States during
armed conflict, and have now gradually come to be recognised as applying to United Nations
forces as well. The rules, embodied in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, should regulate
the conduct of UN forces, and do so insofar as they embody customary international law. It is
to be noted that of the four categories (including the yet to be defined crime of aggression) of
crimes in the Rome Statute,161 it is in the category of war crimes in which the black letter lawthe Geneva Conventions-most strongly establishes inherent or automatic jurisdiction.162 The
common articles state ‘[e]ach High contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered committed, such grave breaches…,
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts…’163This
affirmative obligation will be placed on the UN which can choose to designate the municipal
courts of one or more of the Participating States in a particular mission to prosecute or refer
the matter to the ICC.

However, because there are those who feel that the unique status of the United Nations Forces
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exempts it from the obligation to observe these rules in their entirety, the United Nations
should become a party to the Hague and Geneva Conventions. By doing so, the laws of war
would bind on it as a subject. This, in turn, would rise to direct rights and duties on the part of
individual UN troops. Becoming a party to the Conventions will ensure that the UN Forces
will be held to no less of a standard than other parties to an armed conflict. Such a result is not
only desirable, but is also logical. After all, the UN is the body created ‘to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights’.164 To hold the UN to a lesser standard would require the belief
that the UN itself is not capable of protecting those rights or that the UN exist beyond their
pale.

State immunity and special procedural rules are unavailable under the Rome Statute as a
defence against the institution of criminal proceedings before the International Criminal
Court. Nothing in the Rome Statute provides limitations to the categorisation of subjects who
can have judicial proceedings instituted against them by the three methods laid down, that
would the trigger the prosecutory mechanism as long as they are natural persons.165 This is
important as the UN urges national courts to prosecute UN forces responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law.166 Thrice in the last decade of the 20th Century, national
adjudicative mechanisms failed to guarantee justice for the victims of laws of war167
violations by UN forces.

The issue of the Court’s judicial authority over UN forces is unpalatable to the international
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and national political framework and is a volatile international issue in view of its potential to
cripple Security Council sanctioned ‘police action’. Concommitantly there may be concern
that subjecting the UN troops to the international judicial process would curtail advances in
the post Cold War collective global security regime. It is instructive that the complementarity
regime in the Statute represents a broad protection regime for State Parties.168 Through
complementarity, State jurisdiction is preserved by efficiently operating national criminal
justice systems. It is in the interests of the planet’s citizenry that the UN be held accountable
for its military operations. For long State political interests have subsumed the interests of
‘[w]e the people of the United Nations’169 reducing the UN to a global association of Nation States rather than an organisation entrusted with the human rights values and aspirations of
the planet’s citizenry. A blank cheque to the Security Council in its ‘police action’ is an
anathema to the international rule-of-law regime that the UN is building as a foundation for
the international legal order. General UN policy subscribing to the application of fundamental
principles and rules of international humanitarian law is not enough. The rights and duties
must be directly possessed by the UN as a subject of these laws and ultimately these rights
and duties must be transposed to the objects concerned, the individual UN troops.

The reality is that the ICC is still along way in coming, thus there is an urgent need to
strengthen the current UN military operation framework. The Security Council routinely
adopts resolutions long on generalities and short on particulars. It is important that the
conceptual and procedural clarity of the mandate is spelt out. The Security Council should
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provide meaningful military guidelines of the operation in light of the mandate. Particular
emphasis should be given to observance of international humanitarian law especially by UN
troops involved in a spectrum of conflict.

Problems also exist throughout the entire chain of command in UN forces. The UN secretariat
should carry out further reforms in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), by
putting in place a standing command-and-control cadre.

170

One of the most significant

challenges of any UN military mission is the establishment of a field headquarters. Generally
new staff take time to know each other, and most importantly to establish ground rules for
working together and addressing issues arising from the troops as a collectivity rather than as
a loose association of semi-autonomous national contingents. Inevitably, force commanders
end up by-passing mission field headquarters, and receiving orders from their Capitals on all
aspects of troop misconduct. This is owing to governments’ exclusive rights to deal with
troop indiscipline in their contingents.171 This allows any damaging information and/or
evidence on troop misconduct to be labelled as classified by concerned governments and thus
out of public domain.

The DPKO office after its 1996 reformation, had units formed within it for among other
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purposes, establishing training criteria and syllabuses for national contingents.172 The Unit
should be active especially among countries that routinely contribute troops, to ensure that the
governments endeavour to disseminate international humanitarian law to the troops
extensively. This will forestall government buck-passing in the event of international
humanitarian violations. Governments contributing troops should be encouraged to brief
troops before departure and to emphasis the need to observe international humanitarian law in
the course of their duties. A reminder that they are not above the rule of international law will
have a sobering effect on troops.

The DPKO should have a nucleus of civilian and military personnel assigned the task of
discipline among UN forces.173 This senior level task force should be responsible for regular
consultations with the field headquarters on the issue of troop discipline and conduct. The task
force should be responsible to the Security Council, and serve as an interface between the
political authorities and force commanders. By being responsible to the Security Council, the
task force will enjoy a sphere of institutional independence from the Secretary-General. Part
of the current dilemma is that the Secretary-General plays two antagonistic roles, he is in
charge of peacekeeping operations and is at the same time expected to be a neutral mediator.

Finally, to deal with the issue of strong national political currents to the externalisation of
troop discipline, senior officers of the larger contributing forces in any given mission should
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form a disciplinary arm as part of the field headquarters staff. Troop-contributing States
should be asked to deal through this mechanism on matters of discipline affecting their
contingent (even as they file reports to their Capitals, which is inevitable)-the representative
disciplinary arm should then investigate, document and safeguard any evidence on the matter.
The task force at the DPKO will second military officers as liaison persons who will forward
reports to the Security Council. This will short-circuit the internalisation of a disciplinary
matter by a particular contingent, and as history has shown, give the governments an
opportunity to destroy or withhold evidence or cover-up. When the information is out in the
open, governments are generally keen to give a good account of themselves. Documented
information and evidence will facilitate military transparency and government accountability,
which is vital, for these two institutions are notorious for using their code of secrecy as an
alibi for conspiracies to deal with image damaging information.

